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A minimal diversity game is an n player strategic form game in which each player has m
pure strategies at his disposal. The payoﬀ to each player is always 1, unless all players
select the same pure strategy, in which case all players receive zero payoﬀ. Such a game
has a unique isolated completely mixed Nash equilibrium in which each player plays each
strategy with equal probability, and a connected component of Nash equilibria consisting
of those strategy proﬁles in which each player receives payoﬀ 1. The Pareto superior com-
ponent is shown to be asymptotically stable under a wide class of evolutionary dynamics,
while the isolated equilibrium is not. On the other hand, the isolated equilibrium is strate-
gically stable, while the strategic stability of the Pareto eﬃcient component depends on
the dimension of the component, and hence on the number of players, and the number of
pure strategies.
JEL Codes. C72, D44.
Keywords. Strategic form games, strategic stability, evolutionary stability.
1 Introduction
Imagine a castle that is being guarded by n soldiers. The castle has two gates, east and west,
and the castle is currently under attack from enemy troops. If each gate is guarded by at least
one soldier, the guards can lock the gates and the enemies won’t enter. However, if one gate
is left unattended then the castle will be taken and all soldiers will perish 1. The question is:
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1This is an example of a binary minimal diversity game. In a binary minimal diversity game each player has
two (pure) strategies and all players win if there is a minimum of diversity in the players choices, i.e. at least
two players choose to do something diﬀerent.Minimal diversity games 1
How should the soldiers choose to defend the castle? Clearly, all that is needed is that not all
soldiers choose to defend the same gate.
The game thus deﬁned has two types of Nash equilibria. In one there is complete lack of
coordination, and each soldier chooses to defend each gate with equal probability. Hence, in
this equilibrium there is a positive probability that all soldiers show up at the same gate, in
which case the castle is taken by the enemy. In the second type of equilibrium the coordination
problem is solved. Two soldiers choose diﬀerent gates, one east and one west, while the
remaining soldiers can, and may, do whatever they like.
The two types of Nash equilibria are very diﬀerent. Can one convincingly argue that one is more
reasonable than the other? In this paper we compare two approaches to answer this question.
We show that, from the evolutionary perspective, the equilibria where the coordination problem
is solved are most natural. We show that they form a set that is asymptotically stable under
a wide class of evolutionary dynamics, while the equilibrium where the coordination problem
is not solved is always unstable. We then take a look at the above choice problem from the
perspective of strategic stability, notably at the more demanding notions of strategic stability:
essentiality as deﬁned by Wu Wen-Ts¨ un and Jiang Jia-He ([13],[23]), best response stability
as deﬁned by Hillas ([8],[9]), and strategic stability in the sense of Mertens ([16],[17]). Here it
turns out that the number of soldiers in the castle starts to matter. Surprisingly, the question
is not whether the number of soldiers is large or small, but whether it is even or odd. If the
number of players is even then the set of Nash equilibria where the coordination problem is
solved contains a strategically stable set, otherwise it does not. The Nash equilibrium where
the coordination problem is not solved is always strategically stable, in virtually any sense.
The main purpose of the paper is to substantiate these claims. We think these ﬁndings are
interesting for at least two reasons. First of all, there is a whole class of very simple games
where the two approaches of evolutionary stability and strategic stability make mutually ex-
clusive predictions, namely whenever the number of players is odd. This contrasts with earlier,
more positive ﬁndings, notably by Swinkels [20] and Demichelis and Ritzberger [3]. Secondly,
the alternating behavior for strategic stability solutions is puzzling. Although we show that
continuity arguments, based on behavior induced by inconsistent beliefs, do provide a basic
intuition for our ﬁndings, continuity is explicitly ruled out by Kohlberg and Mertens [14] as a
reasonable axiom for solution concepts. The question therefore remains what game theoretic
arguments would justify the alternating behavior we ﬁnd for the more demanding notions ofMinimal diversity games 2
strategic stability.
Reﬁnement theory became popular when, with the increased use of game theoretic methods in
Economics in the 1970’s and early 1980’s, it became clear that the notion of a Nash equilibrium
is too weak as a solution concept to analyze relevant economic models. Reﬁnements such as
perfect, proper and sequential equilibrium were introduced and widely used. However, as it
turned out, also reﬁnements of Nash equilibrium allowed for many possible solutions, including
very implausible ones. Moreover, reﬁnements were often only motivated and introduced on an
ad-hoc, example-driven basis. This encouraged game theorists to try to ﬁnd a more systematic
and consistent way to further reﬁne among Nash equilibria. One attempt in this direction is
made in the book Harsanyi and Selten [6], which has the ambitious aim to select a unique Nash
equilibrium for every game.
Another inﬂuential approach is due to Kohlberg and Mertens [14]. In contrast to Harsanyi
and Selten, Kohlberg and Mertens [14], henceforth called K&M, argue that any satisfactory
selection criterion cannot select a single equilibrium, but forces us to select sets of closely
related equilibria. Their second major contribution to the ongoing discussion was to produce
a list of basic criteria such reﬁned sets of equilibria should satisfy. K&M’s point of view was
that, while a full-ﬂedged axiomatic approach may be out of reach, the search for a satisfactory
solution concept should be guided at least by a list of properties that are desirable from a
game theoretical perspective. Their own initial notion of strategically stable sets of equilibria
fails on some of these criteria. However, Mertens [16] proposes a notion of strategic stability
that satisﬁes all the requirements made by K&M and that passes several additional plausibility
tests.
On the other side of the spectrum experimental research, e.g. by G¨ uth et al. [4] on the ulti-
matum game, made it clear that classical game theory, in particular Nash equilibrium, is not
always a good predictor of human behavior. These results inspired a new line of research in
game theory that focused on models of bounded rationality, in an attempt to avoid the tradi-
tional game-theoretic approach to take the assumption that players are rational to its ultimate
conclusions. One such attempt uses learning dynamics to model boundedly rational behavior,
in line with earlier work by evolutionary biologists on animal behavior.
In their seminal work Maynard Smith and Price [15] showed that under certain conditions
such learning dynamics converge to Nash equilibrium. Nash equilibria that are selected via
learning dynamics tend to be rather “reﬁned” Nash equilibria. This raises the question whetherMinimal diversity games 3
the outcomes predicted by the learning approach assuming only bounded rationality 2 might
coincide with the outcomes given by the reﬁnement approach, based on the extreme emphasis
on rationality.
Indeed, Demichelis and Ritzberger [3] (henceforth called D&R) showed that for a wide class
of evolutionary dynamics any asymptotically stable Nash equilibrium is automatically strate-
gically stable in the sense of Mertens. 3
However, as K&M emphasized, in general one should look for sets of Nash equilibria. Swinkels
[20] noted that the analysis for sets of Nash equilibria is complicated by the fact that topo-
logical properties of the sets start to matter. He showed for a wide class of dynamics that
asymptotically stable sets of the dynamics contain a strategically stable (even a hyper-stable)
set as deﬁned by K&M, provided that the set is contractible. D&R considerably sharpen this
result. They show for a wide class of dynamics that sets that are asymptotically stable under
the dynamics contain a stable set of Nash equilibria in the sense of Mertens, provided the set
has non-zero Euler characteristic.
While these results show a strong connection between evolutionary and strategic stability
under certain topological restrictions on the solution set, it does not rule out the existence of
convincing examples where the two types of stability are not related. The aim of this paper is
precisely to provide such examples.
More concretely, we present a natural class of coordination games, called minimal diversity
games. Minimal diversity games are coordination games with a slight twist. In classical
coordination games, all players have to choose the same action in order to coordinate. Here the
task faced by the players is precisely to avoid choosing the same action. Each game within this
class has a set of Nash equilibria that consists of one isolated completely mixed Nash equilibrium
and one connected component of Pareto dominant Nash equilibria 4. For two families of
games within the class of minimal diversity games 5 we show that any suﬃciently strong
notion of strategic stability exclusively selects the isolated completely mixed equilibrium, while
evolutionary stability exclusively selects the component of Pareto dominant Nash equilibria.
Thus, minimal diversity games provide such examples of games where the predictions made by
2In the literature on bounded rationality evolutionary models are re-interpreted as learning models.
3As Swinkels [20] pointed out, traditional game theory and evolutionary game theory cannot be compared
directly because of the additional symmetry assumptions made in the latter approach. The results in Ritzberger
and Demichelis [3] and related literature are obtained once the assumption of symmetry in evolutionary game
theory is dropped, and conﬂicts are considered to be inter-species rather than within the same species.
4The connected component is in fact a strict equilibrium set, as is shown in Balkenborg and Schlag [1].
5In one family there are two players with an odd number of strategies, and in the other there are two
strategies and an odd number of players.Minimal diversity games 4
evolutionary stability and strategic stability are diﬀerent, even in the strong sense that they
may be mutually exclusive.
We conjecture that our results are not merely “accidental”, but true in the following more
general sense. In section 3 we show for any minimal diversity game with n players and m actions
that the set of eﬃcient Nash equilibria is a topological sphere of dimension d = (n−1)(m−1)−1.
Our results strongly indicate that strategic stability and evolutionary stability make mutually
exclusive predictions precisely when the dimension d of the set of eﬃcient Nash equilibria is
odd. This would be entirely in line with the conjecture of Swinkels that the topology of the
component of Nash equilibria in question, speciﬁcally its Euler characteristic, is the decisive
factor in the connection (and the distinction!) between the two types of stability.
In relation to this last observation it is interesting to see that, in those cases where the eﬃcient
set is not strategically stable, we can also show that it is not essential in the sense of Wu
Wen-Tsun and Jiang Jia-He [13], [23]. This implies that many evolutionary dynamics never
converge to any equilibrium 6. In this sense strategic stability matters for evolutionary stability
even when at ﬁrst sight it seems to be irrelevant.
K&M already stressed the necessity to discard the focus on generic classes of strategic form
games, but rather study natural subclasses within the class of strategic form games. K&M made
this observation in the context of extensive form games, where the class of games considered
was deﬁned by ﬁxing the game tree of an extensive form game, and by varying the payoﬀs
of players at the terminal nodes of the game tree. In a similar vein our class of minimal
diversity games is a natural class of potential games, very much in the spirit of games such as
for example Colonel Blotto games 7. In the class of potential games minimal diversity games
are characterized only by the requirement that players, similar to the task of players in Colonel
Blotto games, need to “avoid coordination” in order to maximize their joint payoﬀ.
The paper is organized as follows. After some preliminaries we introduce the class of minimal
diversity games. We show that the set of Nash equilibria of each minimal diversity game
consists of an isolated completely mixed equilibrium and a connected component G of eﬃcient
equilibria. The latter is shown to be a topological sphere of dimension d = (n−1) (m−1)−1,
where n is the number of players and m the number of actions. We then show for a wide class
of dynamics (including the replicator dynamics as well as the class of Nash dynamics deﬁned by
6This ﬁnding strengthens the observation in D&M that these sets of Nash equilibria are not robustly evolu-
tionary stable. Notice, however, that there are still asymptotically stable attractors not containing ﬁxed points
in the nearby games
7See among others Hart [7], and Monderer and Shapley [18] for motivation and explanation of these games.Minimal diversity games 5
D&R) that the set G is asymptotically stable, while the completely mixed equilibrium is not.
Thereafter we turn to strategic stability where we ﬁrst observe that all equilibrium components
of these games are strategically stable in the sense of Kohlberg and Mertens. We then derive
the results indicated above, ﬁrst for games with two players and arbitrary number of players,
and next for games with two strategies and an arbitrary number of players. The Appendix is
entirely devoted to the proof of Theorem 7.2.
2 Preliminaries
This paper concerns the class of minimal diversity games. However, many concepts applied
here are deﬁned for general normal form games. It will hence be useful to have some basic
notation and terminology available for these games.
A ﬁnite normal form game consists of a ﬁnite set of players N = {1,   ,n}, and for each player
i ∈ N a ﬁnite pure strategy set Si and a payoﬀ function ui:S → R on the set S :=
 
i∈N Si of
pure strategy proﬁles. We denote the game by (N,u), where u = (ui)i∈N is the vector of payoﬀ
functions. A mixed strategy σi of player i is a vector (σi(si))si∈Si that assigns a probability
σi(si) ≥ 0 to each pure strategy si ∈ Si. We denote the set of mixed strategies of player i by
Σi. The set of all proﬁles σ = (σi)i∈N of mixed strategies is denoted by Σ. The support of a
mixed strategy σi is the set of all pure strategies si with σi(si) > 0. The multilinear extension







By ui(σ | si) we denote the payoﬀ to player i when player i plays pure strategy si ∈ Si while
his opponents adhere to the mixed strategy proﬁle σ. A strategy proﬁle σ ∈ Σ is a Nash
equilibrium when ui(σ) ≥ ui(σ | si) holds for every player i and every pure strategy si of
player i.
MINIMAL DIVERSITY GAMES A minimal diversity game is a normal form game (N,u) such
that Si = M = {1,...,m} for every player i ∈ N, and
ui (s1,   ,sn) =
 
0 if s1 = s2 = ... = sn
1 else.
To simplify notation for minimal diversity games, for player i and pure strategy k, we denote
the probability σi(k) that player i assigns to pure strategy k in strategy proﬁle σ by σik.
STRATEGIC STABILITY In this paper we use several diﬀerent notions of strategic stability,
notably regularity, deﬁned by Harsanyi [5], essentiality, deﬁned by Wu Wen-Tsun and JiangMinimal diversity games 6
Jia-He [13], [23], KM stability, hyperstability and full stability, deﬁned by K&M, strategic
stability in the sense of Mertens, deﬁned by Mertens [16], and best response stability, deﬁned
by Hillas [8]. KM stability was simply called stability in K&M, and the same holds for best
response stability in Hillas [8]. We use the terms KM stability and best response stability in
this paper to avoid confusion.
We do not deﬁne most of these notions, because we rely on the results of D&R and Hillas et al.
[9] for most of our conclusions. We explicitly use the deﬁnitions of essentiality and regularity
though, and for that reason we state here their formal deﬁnitions. For two games (N,u) and
(N,v) with the same player set, we write
 u − v  = max{|ui(s) − vi(s)| | s ∈ S,i ∈ N}.
A closed set C ⊂ Σ of Nash equilibria of the game (N,u) is called essential when for every
open set U ⊂ Σ containing C there is a ε > 0 such that every game (N,v) with  u − v  < ε
has a Nash equilibrium in U.
A Nash equilibrium σ of (N,u) is called regular if there exist open sets U ∋ u and V ∋ σ and
a continuously diﬀerentiable function g:U → V such that for any v ∈ U and τ ∈ V we have
g(v) = τ precisely when τ is a Nash equilibrium of (N,v).
Notice that the deﬁnition automatically implies g(u) = σ. It is known that a regular equilibrium
is strategically stable in virtually any sense: it is perfect, proper, essential, best response stable,
and even strategically stable in the sense of Mertens.
Best response stability is, in an alternative formulation called CKM-stability, deﬁned in the
Appendix. For information on the remaining notions of strategic stability we refer the interested
reader to the original papers.
3 The Nash equilibria of a minimal diversity game
In this section we show that the set of Nash equilibria of a minimal diversity game consists of two
components. One component consists of a single isolated completely mixed Nash equilibrium.
The other component consists of all strategy proﬁles in which at least two players play a
diﬀerent pure strategy. We show that this second component is homeomorphic to a sphere of
dimension d = (n − 1)   (m − 1) − 1.
It is easy to verify that the completely mixed strategy proﬁle in which each player randomizes
with equal probability 1
m between all his pure strategies is a Nash equilibrium with an expectedMinimal diversity games 7




for each player. We denote this Nash equilibrium by ρ = (ρi)i∈N.
Secondly, every strategy proﬁle where one (and hence every) player gets the maximal expected
payoﬀ one is clearly a Nash equilibrium. We denote the set of all such Nash equilibria by G.
Note that G is in fact the set of all Pareto-eﬃcient strategy proﬁles in the game.
To illustrate the set G we consider one of the simplest minimal diversity games, namely the
game with three players and two strategies each. In this case each player’s mixed strategy










The pure strategy proﬁles are the corners of the cube. The Nash equilibrium ρ in completely
mixed strategies is in the center of the cube. The set G of Pareto eﬃcient Nash equilibria is
the cycle on the boundary consisting of six line segments. Along each line segment each pure
strategy is not used by one of the players.
More generally, for each minimal diversity games the set G is a union of faces of Σ. The faces
of G that have maximal dimension d = (n −1)×(m −1) −1 are characterized as follows. For
each pure strategy k, let J(k) be a player. This deﬁnes a map J:M → N. Write
GJ = {σ | σJ(k)(k) = 0 for all k ∈ M}.
The set GJ is a face of Σ of dimension d as soon as J−1(i)  = M for each player i. Further, G
is the union of these faces GJ. We show the following two facts.
(1) Apart from ρ and the strategy proﬁles in G a minimal diversity game has no other Nash
equilibria.Minimal diversity games 8
(2) G is a topological sphere of dimension d = (n − 1) × (m − 1) − 1. This means that G is
homeomorphic 8 to  







Consequently, ρ is an isolated Nash equilibrium and G is a connected component of Nash
equilibria 9.
Proposition 3.1 The Nash equilibria of a minimal diversity game are precisely the strategy
proﬁles in G, together with the completely mixed strategy proﬁle ρ.
Proof. Let σ be a Nash equilibrium of the game in completely mixed strategies. For each
k ∈ M, write σk =
 
i∈N σik. Since in a completely mixed equilibrium each player is indiﬀerent




















σjlσjk for all k,l ∈ M. Summing over k we obtain 1 =
σil
σjl. Hence σil = σjl
for every l ∈ M, which shows that all players use the same strategy. Therefore (σik)n =
 




σik, it follows that σil = σik for
every i ∈ N and k ∈ M. Thus each player uses each pure strategy in M with equal probability
and we conclude that σ = ρ.
Suppose next that σ is a Nash equilibrium, and that σik = 0 for some i ∈ N and k ∈ M.
Then every player j  = i can ensure himself the maximal payoﬀ 1 by playing pure strategy k.
So, since σ is Nash equilibrium, every player j  = i, and then also i, receives payoﬀ 1 under σ.
Hence σ ∈ G by deﬁnition.
3.1 G is a topological sphere
In this section we show that the connected component G of Pareto eﬃcient Nash equilibria is
homeomorphic to a sphere of dimension d = (n − 1)   (m − 1) − 1.
We brieﬂy sketch the outline of the proof. Let D be the “diagonal” consisting of all strategy
proﬁles where all players play the same strategy. Clearly, D is a simplex of dimension m − 1.
8Although not diﬀeomorphic.
9Except when m = n = 2. In this case G consists of two isolated Nash equilibria, and hence it is homeo-
morphic to the two endpoints of the unit interval.Minimal diversity games 9
Within the aﬃne hull of Σ, consider the aﬃne space L through the center point ρ orthogonal
to D. So, L has dimension
n   (m − 1) − (m − 1) = (n − 1)   (m − 1).
Moreover, the orthogonal projection of Σ onto L is a convex polyhedron. We show that this
polyhedron is of full dimension, and that the set G of Pareto-eﬃcient Nash equilibria is mapped
one-to-one onto the boundary of the polyhedron P. Hence, G is homeomorphic to a sphere of
dimension d = (n − 1)   (m − 1) − 1.
Proposition 3.2 For any minimal diversity game the set G of eﬃcient Nash equilibria is
homeomorphic to a sphere of dimension d = (n − 1)   (m − 1) − 1.
Proof. It suﬃces to show that G is homeomorphic to the boundary of a compact and convex
set of dimension (n − 1)   (m − 1).
A mixed strategy proﬁle σ = (σi(k))i∈N,k∈M of the minimal diversity game is a point in the





for σ, τ ∈ Rmn. For each k ∈ M, let dk be the strategy proﬁle where each player plays pure
strategy k with probability one, and let δk = dk − ρ. For i ∈ N, let ei be the vector in Rmn
which assigns 1 to each coordinate corresponding to a pure strategy of player i and 0 to all
other coordinates.
Claim 1. The vectors δk together with the vectors ei span a linear subspace of dimension
m + n − 1.
Proof of Claim 1. Since
 
k∈M δk = 0 this linear subspace has a dimension of at most
m + n − 1. It has at least this dimension since, for a given pure strategy l ∈ M, the vectors
δk for k  = l together with the vectors ei are linearly independent. This can be seen as follows.





















Since each coordinate (i,l) of this vector must be zero we obtain 1
m
 























and the linear combination is equal to
 
k =l αkdk. Since each coordinate (i,k) must be zero it
follows αk = 0 for all k  = l and hence also βi = 0 for all i ∈ N.Minimal diversity games 10
We conclude that the linear subspace L consisting of the vectors orthogonal to all vectors δk
and ei has dimension (m − 1)   (n − 1).
Claim 2. L is the image of Rmn under the orthogonal projection










 σ,ei ei with σ ∈ R
mn.
Proof of Claim 2. Clearly, P equals the identity map on L and hence L is contained in the
image space of P. Further, for all indices i,j and k,l, we have  δk,ei  = 0,
 δk,δl  =
 
n − n
m for k = l
− n
m for k  = l, and  ei,ej  =
 
m for i = j
0 for i  = j.
Therefore  P(σ),ej  = 0 holds for any j, and for l we also obtain





 σ,δk  δk,δl 











δk  = 0.
Thus the projection maps into L, which proves the claim.
The mixed strategy space Σ of the game is a convex polyhedron which is mapped under the
projection P onto a convex polyhedron P (Σ).
Claim 3. The convex polyhedron P(Σ) spans the linear subspace L and is hence a compact
and convex set of dimension (m − 1)   (n − 1).
Proof of Claim 3. For each x ∈ L choose a suﬃciently small scalar λ > 0 such that λx + ρ
has only non-negative coordinates. Since  λx + ρ,ei  = 1, λx + ρ is a strategy proﬁle. Thus,
since P(ρ) = 0, we have P(λx+ρ) = λP(x)+P(ρ) = λx. It follows that P(Σ) spans L, which
proves claim 3.
We show next that the projection maps the set of Pareto eﬃcient Nash equilibria G homeo-
morphically onto the boundary of P(Σ) in L. Let J:M → N be a map with J−1(i)  = M for
all i ∈ N. The set
GJ =
 
σ ∈ Σ | σJ(k)(k) = 0 for all k ∈ M
 
is a face of G of maximal dimension. For any σ ∈ Σ we have by a straightforward calculation
that





 σ,dk dk.Minimal diversity games 11
Suppose that two strategy proﬁles σ,τ ∈ GJ satisfy P(σ) = P(τ). Then by the previous
observation





 σ − τ,dk dk.
Further, for any l we have σJ(l)(l) = τJ(l)(l) = 0. Hence, when we write ei,l for the vector in
Rmn that has a one in coordinate (i,l) and zeroes otherwise, we have





 σ − τ,dk dk,eJ(l),l  =
1
n
 σ − τ,dl 
Hence,  σ − τ,dl  = 0 for every l. It follows that σ = τ. Consequently, the projection is
one-to-one on each face GJ.
Note that the vectors eik in fact constitute the standard basis of Rmn. Let J be the collection
of all maps J:M → N with J−1(i)  = M for all i ∈ N. Given J ∈ J, deﬁne the linear
functional l(J):Rmn → R by l(J)(ei,k) = 1 when i  = J(k) and l(J)(eJ(k),k) = 0.
A mixed strategy σi of player i can be identiﬁed with the vector
 
k∈M σi(k)eik ∈ Rmn. We
have l(J)(σi) =
 
k:i =J(k) σi(k) ≤ 1 whereby equality holds if and only if σi(k) = 0 whenever
i = J(k). For any strategy proﬁle σ ∈ Σ we have hence l(J)(σ) =
 
i∈N l(J)(σi) ≤ n whereby
equality holds if and only σ ∈ GJ. Furthermore we obtain
l(J)(P(σ)) = l(J)(σ)










so that l(J)(δk) = l(J)(dk) − l(J)(ρ) = 0 and hence





 σ,δk l(J)(δk) = l(J)(σ)
for all σ ∈ Σ. Hence l(J)(P(σ)) ≤ n for all σ ∈ Σ whereby equality holds if any only if σ ∈ GJ.
(i) P is one-to-one on G into the boundary of P(Σ). We already know that P is one-to-one
on GJ. Now consider strategy proﬁles σ,τ ∈ Σ with σ ∈ GJ and τ / ∈ GJ. Then by the
previous observations, l(J)(P(σ)) = n while l(J)(P(τ)) < n. Hence, P(σ)  = P(τ). Thus, P is
one-to-one on G.
ii) P(G) equals the relative boundary of P(Σ). P(Σ \ G) equals the relative interior of
P(Σ). Consider the linear map l:L → RJ deﬁned by l(x) = (l(J)(x))j∈J. From theMinimal diversity games 12
previous discussion we conclude that P(G) = l−1(B) and that P(Σ \ G) = l−1(U), where
B = {y ∈ RJ | yJ = n for some J ∈ J} and U = {y ∈ RJ | yJ < n for all J ∈ J}.
We have shown that the map P is a homeomorphism of G onto the boundary of the compact
convex set P(Σ), which has dimension (m − 1)   (n − 1). This proves our claim.
4 Evolutionary dynamics
In this section we show for the large class of evolutionary dymamics called strongly payoﬀ
consistent selection dynamics that G is asymptotically stable, but ρ is not.
As in D&R we deﬁne a payoﬀ consistent selection dynamics to be a Lipschitz continuous vector
ﬁeld f = (fi)i∈N on Σ that does not point outwards on Σ and that satisﬁes for all players i
and all x ∈ Σ
 fi(σ),▽σiUi(σ)  ≥ 0. (1)
We call the selection dynamics strongly payoﬀ consistent if, in addition, all Nash equilibria are
ﬁxed points and if the above inequality is strict for every strategy proﬁle σ and every player
i who has a pure strategy si in the support of σi with ui(σ) < ui(σ | si). The notion of a
strongly payoﬀ consistent selection dynamics weakens the notion of a Nash dynamic in D&R
just enough so that the replicator dynamics is captured as well as a special case.
Proposition 4.1 Suppose we have a strongly payoﬀ consistent selection dynamics in a mini-
mal diversity game. Then the only asymptotically stable set of restpoints is the set G of eﬃcient
Nash equilibria. The completely mixed Nash equilibrium ρ is not asymptotically stable.
Proof. Since all players have the same utility function and the dynamic is strongly payoﬀ
consistent, the chain rule implies that utility is non-decreasing along a trajectory and strictly
increasing in any point where there is a better reply in the support. Now consider a strategy
proﬁle σ with u(σ) < 1 in which no player i has a better reply in the support of σi. Then all
players must play mixed strategies which have the same support, which we denote by T.
To see this, note that otherwise one player would have a pure strategy si in the support of his
strategy σi which is not in the support of the strategy σj of another player. By using only si
player i can then increase everybody’s payoﬀ to 1. Contradiction.
Then the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 3.1, which showed that in a Nash
equilibrium in completely mixed strategies every player must play each pure strategy with
equal probability 1/m, establishes here that in the strategy proﬁle σ each player must useMinimal diversity games 13
each strategy in T with equal probability. It follows that the dynamics can only have a ﬁnite
number of points outside G for which (1) holds with equality for all i.
To see that no rest point σ with u(σ) < 1 is asymptotically stable under the dynamics, notice
that we can ﬁnd strategy proﬁles τ with u(σ) < u(τ) arbitrarily near to σ. Because utility is
increasing on the trajectory starting in τ, the trajectory cannot move towards σ.
Now let c be such that u(σ) < c for all the rest points not in G and consider the neighborhood
U of G consisting of all τ with u(τ) ≥ c. Since utility is strictly increasing along any trajectory
starting in τ ∈ U \ G, Theorem 2.6.1 of Hofbauer and Sigmund [11] implies that any ω-limit
point σ of the trajectory must satisfy ˙ u(σ) = 0. So, inequality (1) holds for all i. Therefore, σ
is an element of G. Hence, G is asymptotically stable.
Somewhat lengthy calculations (available from the authors on request) show that the ﬁnitely
many rest points of the replicator dynamics outside G are unstable hyperbolic rest points. The
stable manifold of such a rest point σ with its common support T can be shown to consist
of the strategy proﬁles where all players use identical mixed strategies with support T. (It is
straightforward to verify that σ is the unique strategy proﬁle maximizing utility within this
set, which is clearly forward invariant under the replicator dynamics. Dimensional arguments
then imply that it is indeed the stable manifold.) Thus the stable manifold of each of these
restpoints is of lower dimension than Σ. Hence there is an open and dense subset of Σ such that
all trajectories starting in it converge to G. In this sense G is “almost” globally asymptotically
stable. Since G is a strict equilibrium set in the sense of Balkenborg and Schlag [1], Theorem
6 of their paper implies that G is an asymptotically stable set of stable rest points of the
replicator dynamics.
5 Strategic stability
Strategic stability is concerned with sets of Nash equilibria that satisfy necessary conditions for
a solution to be acceptable for rational players. Most deﬁnitions of strategic stability require
robustness of a set of Nash equilibria with respect to certain perturbations of the original game.
In this section we are primarily concerned with essentiality (Wu Wen-Tsun and Jiang Jia-He
[13], [23]), KM stability and full stability (K&M) and strategic stability in the sense of Mertens
[16] and Hillas [8].
We study which of the Nash equilibrium components of a minimal diversity game, the set of
Pareto eﬃcient Nash equilibria G or the set {ρ} consisting of the Nash equilibrium in completelyMinimal diversity games 14
mixed strategies, contains a strategically stable set of Nash equilibria according to any of the
notions mentioned.
From the perspective of strategic stability, the analysis for the completely mixed Nash equilib-
rium ρ is straightforward. According to the next Theorem, the Nash equilibrium ρ is regular,
and hence essential and stable in the sense of Mertens. Then it follows from K&M and Hillas
et al. [9] that ρ is also strategically stable according to any of the other notions mentioned
above.
Theorem 5.1 The equilibrium ρ is regular in the sense of Harsanyi. Consequently ρ is also
essential, and the set {ρ} is stable in the sense of Mertens.
Proof. Let (N,u) be a minimal diversity game, and let ρ be its completely mixed equilibrium.





For player i and pure strategy k ≥ 2, deﬁne the function fik:Σ → R by
fik(σ) = u(σ | k) − u(σ | 1).
Since ρ is completely mixed, it is by the Implicit Function Theorem suﬃcient to show that the
Jacobian matrix
∂f














    
    
0 if k = 1 and j  = i
1 if k = 1 and j = i









if k ≥ 2, j  = i and l  = 1.
It is now straightforward to show that the resulting Jacobian matrix
∂f
∂σ(ρ) has full rank. Hence,
ρ is regular, and therefore also essential and stable in the sense of Mertens.
Note that the latter notion of strategic stability also implies many other types of strategic
stability such as full stability, KM stability, and best response stability.
Next we study the strategic stability of the set G of eﬃcient Nash equilibria. Consider a
minimal diversity game, and let G be its set of eﬃcient Nash equilibria. Any game equivalentMinimal diversity games 15
to this game and any perturbation deﬁned by restriction of the strategy space of it is a game
with identical interests, that is, all players have the same payoﬀ function. Then there are Nash
equilibria nearby to strategy proﬁles equivalent to G in every perturbation close to an equivalent
game. These can be found among the strategy proﬁles maximizing the utility function. The
deﬁnitions of strategic stability in K&M hence imply the following 10.
Proposition 5.2 The set G of eﬃcient Nash equilibria of a minimal diversity game contains
a fully stable set, and hence a KM-stable set.
Thus, G is strategically stable under the milder notions of strategic stability deﬁned in K&M.
We proceed to show that the picture starts to change when we turn to the more demanding
notions of strategic stability such as essentiality, best response stability, and strategic stability
in the sense of Mertens.
Theorem 5.3 If both the number of players and the number of pure strategies is even, then G
is essential.
Proof. By Theorem 4.1, G is an asymptotically stable set of rest points under the replicator
dynamics. Consider the extension of this dynamics to a manifold with boundary containing Σ
in its interior as described in D&R. Because the replicator dynamics leaves faces invariant, it
can easily be shown that every trajectory σ(t) starting outside of Σ gets projected orthogonally
onto a trajectory v(t) of the replicator dynamics on a face of Σ 11. In particular it has the same
ω-limit points. It follows that G is an asymptotically stable set of rest points under the extended
dynamics. So, by Theorem 1 in D&R, the index of G is equal to its Euler characteristic, and
hence not zero. Theorem 4 in Ritzberger [19] then implies that G is essential.
Theorem 5.4 If both the number of players and the number of pure strategies is even, then G
contains a strategically stable set in the sense of Mertens.
Proof. We can apply the arguments as in the proof of Theorem 2 in D&R to the dynamics
constructed in the previous theorem. It is not important that the dynamics in question is not
a Nash dynamics, because the arguments in D&R are purely local, and G is a component of
rest points of the dynamics. Hence, G contains a stable set in the sense of Mertens.
10The result extends to the set of strategy proﬁles maximizing the potential in any weighted potential game
as deﬁned in Monderer and Shapley [18].
11In a suitably chosen coordinate system, the diﬀerential equation for points outside σ can be rewritten as
(˙ x, ˙ y) = g(x) − y where y = 0 corresponds to the face and ˙ x = g(x) to the replicator dynamics on that face.Minimal diversity games 16
Where strategic and evolutionary stability depart
We now come to the main results of the paper. We conjecture that for all minimal diversity
games the following result holds. Suppose that the set G of eﬃcient Nash equilibria has odd
dimension. Then it does not contain a strategically stable set in the sense of Mertens or Hillas,
and it also does not contain an essential set.
A fairly intuitive proof 12, using a generalization of the rock-scissors-paper game, is given
for bimatrix games. For binary minimal diversity games (that is, minimal diversity games in
which players only have two pure actions) we have an elementary proof showing that G does
not contain an essential set. Further, speciﬁcally for binary minimal diversity games we develop
a technique to linearize the Nash equilibrium correspondence on the class of KM-perturbed
games. This then allows us to prove the above conjecture in that case.
Whether any of these techniques can be adapted to more general types of minimal diversity
games is not known to us. At least we have proofs for examples with an arbitrarily large
number of players, and an arbitrarily large number of pure actions. These results give us some
conﬁdence that the conjecture might be true in its full generality.
6 Bimatrix games
In this section we give the proof of the conjecture for two-player games. Notice that if the
number of pure strategies is m in a two-player minimal diversity game, the dimension of the
sphere G is m − 2. So we obtain one example for each possible dimension of the sphere. Here
we are interested in the case where m is odd.
Consider then a two-player minimal diversity games with an odd number of strategies m ≥ 3.
We show in two steps that G does not contain a best response stable set. It does therefore also
not contain a strategically stable set in the sense of Mertens. Moreover, we show that G does
not contain an essential set.
First, we introduce a weak notion of strategic stability called independent t-stability. We show
that every best response stable set as well as every essential set must contain a t-stable set.
Secondly we show that G does not contain an independent t-stable set.
Deﬁnition An independent t-perturbation of size ε of a game (N,u) is a collection (ti)i∈N of
12Although the proof uses rather sophisticated tools from Hillas et al. [9].Minimal diversity games 17
maps ti:Si → Σi such that  ti(si)−si  < ε for every pure strategy si ∈ Si. Each independent
t-perturbation of a game deﬁnes a t-perturbed game (N,ut) in normal form, with the same
strategy sets Si as the original game, but new utility functions ut
i:S → R given by
ut
i(s) = ui (t(s) | si),
where t(s) = t((si)i∈N) = (ti(si))i∈N.
A t-perturbed game obviously deﬁnes a particular payoﬀ-perturbed game. The t-perturbations
are, however, more general than trembling hand perturbations because the trembles of a player
are correlated with his intended pure strategy choice. Because of this correlation it matters
now for the choice of an optimal strategy (and hence for the Nash equilibria of the perturbed
game) whether a player ignores his own trembles or not. In our deﬁnition of a t-perturbed game
a player ignores his own trembles. As a consequence, a t-perturbation of a game with identical
payoﬀ does not have to have identical interests and therefore arguments as in Proposition 5.2
do not apply.
Deﬁnition A non-empty connected closed set C of Nash equilibria is an independent t-set
if there is a Nash equilibrium close to C in every suﬃciently small t-perturbation of the game.
Proposition 6.1 Let m ≥ 3 be odd. Then the set G of the two player minimal diversity game
with m pure strategies is not an independent t-set.
Proof. Let m ≥ 3 be odd. Let ε > 0. For the two-player minimal diversity game with m
strategies we construct an independent t-perturbation t of size ε such that the unique Nash






l=0 εl   sil
where we denote by sil player i’s l-th pure strategy. If we multiply the payoﬀs by the common
factor f =
 m−1
l=0 εl, the rescaled payoﬀs in the t-perturbed game are given by
f   ut
1(l,k) = f   ut
2(k,l) = f − ε(l−k) mod m.
Consider a Nash equilibrium σ of the t-perturbed game. Assume that σ  = ρ. We derive a
contradiction. Assume without loss that σ2  = ρ2. We ﬁrst show the following claim.
Claim. Let 1 ≤ k ≤ m be such that
σ2k = min
1≤l≤m
σ2l.Minimal diversity games 18
Then σ1,k−1 = 0 (where σ1,k−1 = σ1,m if k = 1).
Proof of claim. We assume without loss that k = m. We compute that
f   u
t
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1(m,σ2) − f   u
t


















εm−1−l(1 − ε)(σ2l − σ2m) > 0.
Strict inequality holds because σ2m ≤ σ2l for all l and σ2m < σ2l for at least one l. This
concludes the proof of the claim.
Now we can proceed as follows. From the assumptions that σ2  = ρ2 and σ2m = min1≤l≤m σ2l
we concluded that σ1,m−1 = 0. So, σ1  = ρ1 and σ1,m−1 = min1≤l≤m σ1l. Thus the claim
implies that σ2,m−2 = 0. Iterating the argument yields σ1,m−3 = 0, then σ2,m−4 = 0 and so
on, with the player index alternating between 2 and 1.
Thus, since m is odd, we see that σ2l = 0 for l odd and σ1l = 0 for l even. We obtain in
particular after m − 1 steps that σ21 = 0. Now the claim yields σ1m = 0. Iteration of the
argument yields σ1l = 0 for l odd and σ2l = 0 for l even. We have shown that σ1l = σ2l = 0
for all l. Contradiction. This completes the proof.
Now we can show the main result of this section.
Theorem 6.2 Let m ≥ 3 be odd. Then the set G of the two player minimal diversity game
with m pure strategies is not essential. Also it does not contain a best response stable set.
Proof. Let (N,u) be a game. We argue that a closed set C of Nash equilibria of the game
(N,u) that is essential or best response stable stable necessarily contains an independent t-set.
The result then immediately follows from Proposition 6.1.Minimal diversity games 19
For essentiality this follows from the observation that, when the size of a t-perturbation is
small, also  u − ut  is small by deﬁnition of ut and the continuity of the payoﬀ function u.
Assume that C is best response stable. Then, according to Hillas et al. [9], the set C must
contain a so-called CT set 13. This means in particular that, for every suﬃciently small
independent t-perturbation, the correspondence BRt deﬁned by
BRt(σ) = convex hull {t(s) | s ∈ PB(σ)},
where PB is the pure best reply correspondence, has a ﬁxed point close to C. Let σ ∈ BRt(σ)
be such a ﬁxed point. Then, because t is an independent t-perturbation, each σi is in the
convex hull of the strategies ti(si) with si ∈ PBi(σ). Hence, for each player i there is a vector




φ(σ,t)i(si)   ti(si),
while moreover φ(σ,t)i(si) > 0 implies that si ∈ PBi(σ). Write φ(σ,t) = (φ(σ,t)i)i∈N. Using
the deﬁnition of the payoﬀ function ut
i and the multilinearity of the payoﬀ function ui it is
straightforward to check that
ut
i(φ(σ,t) | si) = ui(σ | si)
for all pure strategies si of player i. Now suppose that φ(σ,t)i(si) > 0. Then, as noted before,
si ∈ PBi(σ). Thus, according to the above displayed equality, si is a pure best reply to φ(σ,t)
in the game (N,ut). Therefore φi is a best reply to φ in the t-perturbed game (N,ut) and
hence φ(σ,t) is a Nash equilibrium of the t-perturbed game (N,ut).
It remains to show that, for suﬃciently small t, φ(σ,t) is close to C whenever σ is close to C.
This follows readily once we observe that, for small t, ti(si) is close to si for all si. Hence,
φ(σ,t)i(si) is close to σi(si) and φ(σ,t) is close to σ. This concludes the proof.
7 Binary minimal diversity games
The second class of minimal diversity games for which we prove the conjecture that evolutionary
and strategic stability make mutually exclusive choices is the class of binary minimal diversity
games. A binary minimal diversity game is a game in strategic form with player set N =
{1,...,n} in which each player has two pure strategies A and B at his disposal. We assume
that n is odd and n ≥ 3. Let S denote the set of pure strategy proﬁles s = (si)i∈N where
13See Subsection 5.1 of their paper for the deﬁnition.Minimal diversity games 20




0 when s1 =     = sn
1 else.
A typical mixed strategy is denoted by σ = (σiA,σiB)i∈N, where σiA (σiB) denotes the prob-
ability with which player i plays pure strategy A (B). Obviously σiA ≥ 0, σiB ≥ 0, and
σiA + σiB = 1. Alternatively we write σ = (σi,1 − σi)i∈N for a generic strategy proﬁle. The
space of mixed strategy proﬁles is denoted by Σ.
7.1 Essentiality
In this section we show, for odd n, that G is not essential in the sense of Wu Wen-Tsun and
Jiang Jia-He [13], [23]. Let (N,u) denote the binary minimal diversity game. It suﬃces to
construct a small perturbation of the game (N,u) that does not have Nash equilibria close to G.
Let (N,v) denote the strategic form game with player set N and payoﬀ functions v = (vi)i∈N,
where vi is deﬁned by
vi(s) =
 
1 if si  = si−1
0 else,
with the convention that player 0 equals player n. Take ε > 0. Consider the game v(ε) = u+εv.
We show that the strategy proﬁle in which each player plays both his pure strategies with weight
1
2 is the unique Nash equilibrium of the game v(ε).





i∈N with σi = 1
2 for all i ∈ N.
Proof. The proof is in three steps.
A. First notice that the strategy proﬁle in which each player plays both his pure strategies
with weight 1
2 is a Nash equilibrium of both the game u and the game v. Therefore it is also a





i∈N be a Nash equilibrium of the game v(ε). Suppose that it is an element
of the boundary of the space of strategy proﬁles. Suppose w.l.o.g. that σ1 = 0. Then necessarily
σ2 = 1. Because n is odd, iterating this argument leads to σ1 = 1. Contradiction. Hence the
game v(ε) only has completely mixed Nash equilibria.




i∈N of the game
v(ε) for which σi  = 1
2 for at least one i ∈ N. Assume w.l.o.g. that σi > 1





σj + ε(1 − σi) = 1 −
 
j =i+1
(1 − σj) + εσi





j =i,i+1(1 − σj) + ε
 




1−σj for all j ∈ N. Note that αi > 1, because we assumed that σi > 1
2. From






j =i,i+1(1 − σj) + ε
 
j =i,i+1 σj + ε
<
 









Then we know that αj < 1 for at least one j ∈ N. So, there must be a player k with αk > 1
and αk−1 ≤ 1. Write α =
 
j∈N






which can be rewritten to α ≥ αk. Hence, α ≥ αk > 1. However, since there also exists a
player j for which αj < 1, the same line of reasoning yields α < 1. Contradiction.
The above construction has a very intriguing interpretation in terms of the illustrative story in
the introduction. Recall that in this story n soldiers are in charge of the defense of a castle with
two gates, east and west. Both gates need to be guarded by at least one soldier to ensure safety
of the soldiers. When n = 2, the defense tactics are evident: each soldier guards one gate, and
this is a strategically stable solution. However, consider the case where there are three soldiers,
let us say Edmund, Baldrick, and George. Suppose they agree that Edmund will guard the
east gate, while Baldrick is assigned to the west gate, and George is free. However, all three
of them are prone to make slight mistakes in the fulﬁlment of their duties. The assessments of
each of them regarding the probability of the others to make a mistake are as follows: George
trusts Baldrick more than Edmund, Baldrick trusts Edmund more than George, and Edmund
trusts George more than Baldrick. Since George trusts Baldrick more than Edmund, his best
option now is to help Edmund at the east gate. This relieves Edmund of his duties. Since
he trusts George more than Baldrick, he moves over to the west gate, thus relieving Baldrick
of his duties. Now, Baldrick trusts Edmund more than George, he in turn moves to the east
gate, setting free George. However, compared to the initial situation, Baldrick and Edmund
have now switched places. Hence, George will now move to the west gate. And as you can
see, our brave soldiers will run around for ever. This eﬀect occurs exactly when the numberMinimal diversity games 22
of soldiers is odd. With an even number of soldiers the dynamics will eventually settle in a
situation where the number of soldiers present at each gate is equal. Notice it is crucial that
the assessments of the soldiers regarding each others’ reliability is not consistent.
In fact the perturbed games are generalized Shapley games as in Hofbauer and Swinkels [12].
This means that in these games any (suﬃciently small) open neighborhood of G contains an
attractor of any strongly payoﬀ consistent dynamics, while it (in the perturbed game!) does
not contain any Nash equilibria.
7.2 Strategic stability, deﬁnitions of Mertens and Hillas
In this section we argue that for odd n, G is not best response stable in the sense of Hillas [8].
The results of Hillas et al. [9] then imply that G is also not homotopy stable, and hence also
not stable in the sense of Mertens [16]. In fact, we argue that, when n is odd, G is not a CKM
set as it is deﬁned in Hillas et al. [9]. The above claims are then implied by the results of that
paper.
Let Γ = (N,u) be a binary minimal diversity game. A KM perturbation of this game is a vector
η = (ηiA,ηiB)i∈N of non-negative numbers ηiA and ηiB. In the η-perturbed game player i is
forced to play pure strategy A (B) with a minimal probability of ηiA (ηiB). We denote the
η-perturbed game by Γ(η). The size of KM perturbation η is  η ∞.
The set of KM perturbations is denoted by K. Let E be the set of pairs (η,σ) in K×Σ for which
the mixed strategy proﬁle σ is a Nash equilibrium of the game Γ(η). A CKM perturbation is a
continuous function ε from the space Σ of strategy proﬁles to the space K of KM perturbations.
The size of CKM perturbation ε is
 ε  = max{ ε(σ) ∞ | σ ∈ Σ}.
The graph of ε is the set of pairs (ε(σ),σ) for σ ∈ Σ. It is denoted by graph[ε].
Deﬁnition. A closed set S ⊂ Σ is called a CKM set if for every neighborhood U of S
there exists ζ > 0 such that for every CKM perturbation ε with  ε  < ζ there exists a point
(η,σ) ∈ graph[ε] ∩ E with σ ∈ U.
Theorem 7.2 Let n ≥ 3 be odd. Then the set G of the binary minimal diversity game with n
players does not contain a best response stable set.
The proof is deferred to the Appendix. Note that an immediate consequence of the aboveMinimal diversity games 23
Theorem is that, for n odd, G is also neither homotopy stable, nor stable in the sense of
Mertens.
8 Discussion and conclusion
In this paper we presented the class of minimal diversity games, a subclass of the class of
potential games. The set of Nash equilibria of each minimal diversity game is shown to consist
of a symmetric isolated completely mixed equilibrium ρ and a connected component G of
strategy proﬁles that maximize the common payoﬀ function.
The completely mixed equilibrium ρ is strategically stable in virtually any sense: it is perfect,
proper, regular, essential, best response stable, and stable in the sense of Mertens. However, ρ
is not asymptotically stable.
The connected component G of common payoﬀ maximizers is shown to be asymptotically
stable. It also contains a stable set in the sense of Kohlberg and Mertens. Moreover, we show
that G is homeomorphic to a sphere of dimension d = (n − 1)   (m − 1) − 1, where n is the
number of players, and m is the number of pure strategies. Therefore, when d is even, the
Euler characteristic of G is +2, and zero when d is odd. Thus, by D&R, when d is even, G is
essential and stable in the sense of Mertens.
However, when d is odd, we show for the case where n = 2 and m is odd as well as the case
where m = 2 and n is odd, that G is not essential, not best best response stable, and hence
also not stable in the sense of Mertens. Thus, these cases provide examples of games where
evolutionary stability and strategic stability make mutually exclusive predictions.
One may wonder whether there are game theoretic considerations that conclusively explain
why G ought to be stable, or whether on the contrary there are arguments that explain why G
should not be stable. However, no matter what one’s stance is in these matters, what we want
to emphasize here in this conclusion is that it is hard to think of any conclusive purely game
theoretic argument why in the n even case the cycle should be stable, while in the n odd case
it should not be stable. This inconsistency in treatment of G (depending on the dimension of
G, and ultimately on its Euler characteristic) is exactly what the stronger versions of strategic
stability, in particular stability in homology, best response stability, and essentiality, advocate
in these examples.
The only reasonably convincing explanation we have found thus far is the allegorical story onMinimal diversity games 24
the castle, where for odd dimensions the instability of G is due to inconsistent assessments of
the players regarding each others’ reliability. Still, such an explanation is yet far from any,
positive or normative, game theoretic argument that is free from such detailed descriptions of
players’ behavior as the formation of inconsistent beliefs.
A ﬁnal interesting observation in this context follows from a known result that any stability
concept that satisﬁes the separate worlds axiom and that is at least as strong as homotopy
stability must necessarily be homology type. So, any concept that is at least as strong as
homotopy stability either violates the separate worlds axiom, or agrees with homotopy stability
on treatment of G: G is stable precisely when its dimension is even. This may indicate that
homotopy stability is too strong a requirement for strategic stability. The alternative in the
defense of the stronger notions of strategic stability would be to ﬁnd convincing game theoretic
arguments for the relevance of dimensionality, and more speciﬁcally the relevance of topological
invariants such as the Euler characteristic, for strategic stability. The correct interpretation of
these results is still far from settled, and further research is deﬁnitely called for.
Appendix: Proof of Theorem 7.2
This Appendix is entirely devoted to the proof of Theorem 7.2. The proof of Theorem 7.2
consists of several intermediate steps, which we shall ﬁrst brieﬂy discuss.
In the next section, Section 9, we give a full description of the graph of the equilibrium corre-
spondence over KM perturbations. In order to facilitate computations, we do not work directly
with the original graph of the equilibrium correspondence. Rather, we apply a transformation
to the space K × Σ of perturbation-strategy proﬁle pairs (η,σ) to obtain a completely linear
description of the graph.
In Section 10 we show that, for n ≥ 3 odd, the set G is not a CKM set. First we analyse what
this means in the linearized environment. Then we construct a CKM perturbation that does
not have ﬁxed points close to G. This construction is again subdivided in several steps.
First we construct a KM perturbation, called the initial perturbation, having exactly 2n − 1
equilibria. One is the completely mixed equilibrium ρ. Then there are 2(n − 2) equilibria in
which the ﬁrst k players play the same pure strategy, while the others play the same mixed
strategy 14. The exact probabilities used by the mixing players is precisely determined by the
14In a perturbed game it is not really possible to play a pure strategy due to the restrictions imposed by theMinimal diversity games 25
perturbation. Finally, there are 2 equilibria where the ﬁrst n−1 players all play the same pure
strategy, while the last player plays the other pure strategy. The completely mixed equilibrium
does not concern us, we focus on the 2n − 2 remaining equilibria.
For example, for n = 5, we have the following equilibria. First there is the completely mixed








and ﬁnally the two equilibria (A,A,A,B) and (B,B,B,B,A). In this notation an A (or a
B) in position i stands for “player i plays B (or A) with minimum probability”, while a Z in
position i means that player i plays a mixed strategy (in the sense that he plays both strategies
with strictly more than minimum probability). Only the latter 8 equilibria are of interest to
us because these are all close to the sphere G, while (Z,Z,Z,Z,Z) is not.
The next step in the construction is to show that these equilibria are pairwise linked via
paths in the space of perturbations. In the above example, (A,Z,Z,Z,Z) gets linked to
(A,A,Z,Z,Z), while, via another path, (A,A,A,Z,Z) gets linked to (A,A,A,A,B). In
the same way (B,Z,Z,Z,Z) gets linked to (B,B,Z,Z,Z), and (B,B,B,Z,Z) gets linked
to (B,B,B,B,A).
These paths are then used to construct a CKM perturbation that has no equilibria close to G.
The idea behind the construction is to create a CKM perturbation that avoids an intersection
with the paths connecting the equilibria of the initial perturbation.
9 Geometry of the equilibrium graph
In this section we give a description of the graph E of the equilibrium correspondence over KM
perturbations.
9.1 Perturbed equilibria
Let η = (ηiA,ηiB)i∈N be a KM perturbation of size at most ζ and let σ = (σiA,σiB)i∈N be
a strategy proﬁle with σiA ≥ ηiA and σiB ≥ ηiB. Throughout this section we assume that
the perturbation is completely mixed. We derive the conditions under which σ is a Nash
equilibrium of the perturbed game Γ(η).
perturbations. When we write that a player plays a pure strategy, in this context we simply mean that he plays
the other strategy with minimum weight.Minimal diversity games 26
Deﬁne the sets A, B, and Z by
A := {i ∈ N | σiB = ηiB}
B := {i ∈ N | σiA = ηiA}
Z := {i ∈ N | σiB > ηiB and σiA > ηiA}.
Players in A are those players that under σ play pure strategy A with maximal probability
given η. Similarly players in B are those players that under σ play pure strategy B with
maximal probability given η. The remaining players are in Z. Thus sets A, B and Z partition
the player set N. Dependence of sets A, B, and Z on σ and η is suppressed in the notation,
but should be kept in mind throughout.
First we derive the general conditions that state precisely when strategy proﬁle σ is a Nash
equilibrium of the perturbed game Γ(η).
Lemma 9.1 Suppose that σ is a Nash equilibrium of Γ(η). Then there exists a real number
c ∈ (0,1) such that σiA = c for all i ∈ Z.
Proof. Take two players i and j in Z. Since both players are indiﬀerent between playing A































Hence, since the function σ  → σ
1−σ is strictly increasing on the open interval (0,1), it follows
that σiA = σjA.
Write z = |Z|. The general equilibrium conditions are as follows. We already have the
feasibility conditions
(a) For all i ∈ A σiA ≥ ηiA and σiB = ηiB
(b) For all i ∈ B σiA = ηiA and σiB ≥ ηiB
(c) For all i ∈ Z σiA > ηiA and σiB > ηiBMinimal diversity games 27
Furthermore, there is a c ∈ (0,1) such that
(1) For all i ∈ Z σiA = c
(2) For all i ∈ Z
 
j∈A

























(4) For all i ∈ B
 
j∈A












Throughout requirements (2), (3), and (4), the left-hand side of the (in)equalities represents the
probability that players not equal to i itself all play pure strategy A, the right-hand side being
the probability that they all play B. Due to the structure of a minimal diversity game, a player
plays optimally precisely when he selects the pure strategy that has the lowest probability.
We treat three exhaustive and non-overlapping cases in which the general conditions reduce to
a simpler system of (in)equalities.
CASE I. z = 0 In case z = 0, the conditions (1) and (2) are empty, and the system reduces to

































This equality can be used to rewrite inequalities (3) and (4) to












Putting these observations together, and using the fact that the function x  → x
1−x is strictly
increasing on the interval (0,1) we obtain the system











(II.3) For all i ∈ A ηiB ≤ 1 − c
(II.4) For all i ∈ B ηiA ≤ c
CASE III. z ≥ 2 Using similar manipulations of the (in)equalities as in the previous case, one
can reduce the general system of equilibrium conditions to
(III.1) For all i ∈ Z σiA = c
(III.2) For all i ∈ Z
 
j∈A










(III.3) For all i ∈ A ηiB ≤ 1 − c
(III.4) For all i ∈ B ηiA ≤ c
This enables us to describe the geometry of the equilibrium correspondence. For suﬃciently
small size ζ we give a fully parameterized description of the graph N(ζ) of the perturbed
equilibrium correspondence.
TYPE I EQUILIBRIA Take a partition A and B of the player set N. For each perturbation η =
(ηiA,ηiB)i∈N that satisﬁes conditions (I.3) and (I.4) we have an equilibrium σ = (σiA,σiB)i∈N
deﬁned by σiA = ηiA for all i ∈ B and σiA = 1 −ηiB for all i ∈ A. Automatically, both sets A
and B are not empty.
TYPE II EQUILIBRIA Take a partition A, B, and Z = {k} of the player set N. For each
perturbation η = (ηiA,ηiB)i∈N that satisﬁes condition (II.2) we have the following line segment
of equilibria. For any c with ηkA ≤ c ≤ 1 − ηkB,
ηiA ≤ c for all i ∈ B and c ≤ 1 − ηiB for all i ∈ A
the strategy proﬁle σ = (σiA,σiB)i∈N deﬁned by σiA = ηiA for all i ∈ B, σiA = 1 − ηiB for all
i ∈ A, and σkA = c, is an equilibrium. Automatically, since n ≥ 3 and z = 1, the sets A and
B are not empty by (II.2).Minimal diversity games 29
TYPE III EQUILIBRIA Take a partition A, B, and Z of the player set N, A or B possibly
























Suppose that η satisﬁes
For all i ∈ A ∪ Z ηiB ≤ 1 − c
For all i ∈ B ∪ Z ηiA ≤ c.
Then the strategy proﬁle σ = (σiA,σiB)i∈N deﬁned by σiA = ηiA for all i ∈ B, σiA = 1 − ηiB
for all i ∈ A, and σiA = c for all i ∈ Z is an equilibrium of the game Γ(η). Note that the
isolated equilibrium ρ is a type III equilibrium, corresponding to the choice A = B = φ and
Z = N.
9.2 Linearization of the equilibrium graph
We can simplify the previous description a bit further. We use the map h:(0,1) → R deﬁned
by
h(x) = logx − log(1 − x)
to linearize the graph of the equilibrium correspondence and to give a full account of the
combinatorial structure of the graph of the equilibrium correspondence.
Clearly h is strictly increasing, and a homeomorphism from the open interval (0,1) to R. Also
note that h(1 − x) = −h(x) and that, for small values of x, the function value h(x) is a large
negative number. We use this map to give a piecewise linear description of the graph of the
equilibrium correspondence as follows. Write yiA = h(ηiA), yiB = h(ηiB), xiA = h(σiA) and
xiB = h(σiB). Notice that σiA + σiB = 1 holds precisely when xiA = −xiB.
TYPE I EQUILIBRIA Take a partition A and B of the player set N such that both sets A and
B are not empty. For a perturbation η = (ηiA,ηiB)i∈N, deﬁne the variables yiA and yiB by
yiA := h(ηiA) and yiB := h(ηiB). The conditions for η to have a type I equilibrium can now
be written as
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In which case we have the linear equilibrium x = (xiA,xiB)i∈N of type I deﬁned by xiA = yiA
for all i ∈ B, xiA = −yiB for all i ∈ A, and xiA = −xiB for all i ∈ N.
TYPE II EQUILIBRIA Take a partition A, B, and Z = {k} of the player set N such that sets








We have the following line segment of linear equilibria. For any γ with
For all i ∈ A ∪ {k} yiB ≤ −γ
For all i ∈ B ∪ {k} yiA ≤ γ.
the strategy proﬁle x = (xiA,xiB)i∈N deﬁned by xiA = yiA for all i ∈ B, xiA = −yiB for all
i ∈ A, and xkA = γ, is a linear equilibrium of type II.
TYPE III EQUILIBRIUM Take a partition A, B, and Z of the player set N, A or B possibly
empty, and |Z| = z ≥ 2. For a perturbation η = (ηiA,ηiB)i∈N, let c be such that







Note that c is uniquely deﬁned this way. Suppose that η satisﬁes
For all i ∈ A ∪ Z ηiB ≤ 1 − c
For all i ∈ B ∪ Z ηiA ≤ c.
When we write













these inequalities can be rewritten to
For all i ∈ A ∪ Z yiB ≤ −γ
For all i ∈ B ∪ Z yiA ≤ γ.
Then the strategy proﬁle x = (xiA,xiB)i∈N deﬁned by xiA = yiA for all i ∈ B, xiA = −yiB for
all i ∈ A, and xiA = γ for all i ∈ Z is a linear equilibrium of type III. Note that the choice
xiA = xiB = 0 is a type III linear equilibrium, corresponding to to the Nash equilibrium ρ in
the perturbed game.Minimal diversity games 31
10 The CKM perturbation
In this section we construct a CKM perturbation that does not intersect the equilibrium cor-
respondence.
10.1 Translation to the linearized equilibrium correspondence
Let Xi denote the space of vectors (xiA,xiB) with xiA = −xiB. Write X =
 
i∈N Xi. Let Yi
denote the space of vectors (yiA,yiB) and write Y =
 
i∈N Yi. A vector (xiA,xiB)i∈N in X is
said to be a linear equilibrium of the (linear) perturbation (yiA,yiB)i∈N when it satisﬁes the
conditions for type I, type II, or type III linear equilibrium of the previous section. We also
sometimes write that the tuple (xiA,xiB,yiA,yiB)i∈N is a linear equilibrium.
Lemma 10.1 Suppose for every K < 0 that there exists an L < 0, a point y∗ ∈ Y , and a
continuous function f:X → Y with the following four properties.
(i) f(x)iA ≤ K and f(x)iB ≤ K for all x ∈ X and all coordinates (i,A) and (i,B)
(ii) for every x ∈ X, when (x,y∗) is a linear equilibrium, then xiA > L and xiB > L for all
i ∈ N
(iii) for every x ∈ X with xiA ≤ L or xiB ≤ L for at least one i ∈ N, f(x) = y∗
(iv) for every x ∈ X with xiA > L and xiB > L for all i ∈ N, if (x,f(x)) is a linear equilibrium,
then x = 0.
Then the sphere G of Pareto eﬃcient Nash equilibria of the binary minimal diversity game is
not a CKM set.
Proof. We want to show that G is not a CKM set. So, we have to construct a neighborhood
U of the sphere G such that for every ζ > 0 there is a CKM perturbation ε with  ε  ≤ ζ and
graph[ε] ∩ E ∩ U is empty.
Let U be the set of strategy proﬁles σ ∈ Σ with σiA < 1
4 or σiB < 1
4 for at least one player
i ∈ N. Clearly U is a neighborhood of G. Take ζ < 0. Take
K = h(ζ) = log(ζ) − log(1 − ζ).
Let L, y∗, and f satisfy the four conditions of the Lemma given this choice of K. For a vector
(ziA,ziB)i∈N with 0 < ziA < 1 and 0 < ziB < 1 for all i ∈ N we deﬁne
H:(ziA,ziB)i∈N  → (h(ziA),h(ziB))i∈N.Minimal diversity games 32
It is easily checked that H is a homeomorphism from (0,1)N to RN. Therefore its inverse H−1
exists and is continuous. We deﬁne the CKM perturbation ε:Σ → K by, for every σ ∈ Σ,
ε(σ) =
 
(H−1 ◦ f ◦ H)(σ) when σ is completely mixed
H−1(y∗) otherwise.
First notice that this is indeed a sound deﬁnition because, for every completely mixed strategy
proﬁle σ, H(σ) is indeed an element of X.
A. The function ε is continuous. Suppose that the sequence (σk)∞
k=1 of strategy proﬁles
converges to the strategy proﬁle σ. When σ is completely mixed, we have ε(σk) → ε(σ) by
the continuity of H, f, and H−1. Suppose that σ is not completely mixed. Without loss we
assume that there is a pair (i,A) with σiA = 0. So, σk
iA → 0 as k → ∞. Then h(σk
iA) → −∞
as k → ∞. So, h(σk
iA) ≤ L for large k. Therefore, by (iii), f(H(σk)) = y∗ for large k. Hence,
(H−1 ◦ f ◦ H)(σk) → H−1(y∗) as k → ∞.
B. We check that  ε(σ) ∞ ≤ ζ for all σ ∈ Σ. Take σ ∈ Σ. Then H(σ) ∈ X. So, by
(i), f(H(σ))iA ≤ K and f(H(σ))iB ≤ K for all (i,A) and (i,B). Hence, by the deﬁnition of
K, h−1(f(H(σ))iA) ≤ ζ and h−1(f(H(σ))iB) ≤ ζ for all (i,A) and (i,B), which implies that
 ε(σ) ∞ ≤ ζ.
C. We check that graph[ε]∩E ∩U is empty. Suppose that (η,σ) is an element of graph[ε]∩
E ∩ U. Then η = ε(σ). So, η is completely mixed by the deﬁnition of ε. Therefore, since
σ is an equilibrium of the η-perturbed game, also σ is completely mixed. So, again by the
deﬁnition of ε, η = (H−1 ◦ f ◦ H)(σ), which implies that H(η) = (f ◦ H)(σ). Consequently,
(H(σ),f(H(σ))) = (H(σ),H(η)) is a linear equilibrium.
If H(σ)iA > L and H(σ)iB > L for all i ∈ N, then H(σ) = 0 by (iv), which implies that
σ = ρ / ∈ U. Therefore H(σ)iA ≤ L or H(σ)iB ≤ L for at least one i ∈ N. So, by (iii),
f(H(σ)) = y∗, and (H(σ),y∗) = (H(σ),f(H(σ))) is a linear equilibrium. Then, by (ii),
H(σ)iA > L and H(σ)iB > L for all i ∈ N. This contradicts the earlier conclusion that
H(σ)iA ≤ L or H(σ)iB ≤ L for at least one i ∈ N.
The remainder of this paper is devoted to the proof that, given K < 0, there do indeed exist
an L < 0, a point y∗ ∈ Y , and a continuous function f:X → Y that satisfy the four properties
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10.2 The initial perturbation
Take K < 0 ﬁxed. Deﬁne the initial perturbation y∗ by
y∗ = (yjA,yjB)j∈N = (K   nj   4j,K   nj   4j)j∈N.
Write yj = K nj  4j. Note that yj = yjA = yjB = K nj  4j. Moreover, for every k = 2,...,n,




We show that the only linear equilibria of y∗ are the ones associated with the partitions
A = {1,...,k} and Z = {k + 1,...n}
for k ≤ n − 2, and
A = {1,...,n − 1} and B = {n}
together with their symmetric counterparts
B = {1,...,k} and Z = {k + 1,...n}
for k ≤ n − 2, and
B = {1,...,n − 1} and A = {n}.
It is straightforward to check that these partitions indeed generate linear equilibria for y∗. We
show that no other partitions generate linear equilibria for this particular perturbation.
First we show that there are no other linear equilibria of type I beyond the two mentioned












This violates inequality (I.4∗).
Next, we show that there are no linear equilibria of type II. Assume w.l.o.g. that there is a
k ∈ B with k > j for all j ∈ A. Then, by (∗),
 
j∈B







which violates equation (II.2∗).Minimal diversity games 34
Finally we show that there are no linear equilibria of type III that have both A  = φ and B  = φ.
Suppose both A  = φ and B  = φ. Assume w.l.o.g. that there is a k ∈ B with k > j for all
j ∈ A. Then γ > 0. So, by inequality (∗), for every i ∈ A,









yj − yk >
 
j∈A







yj − n  
 
j∈A




≥ −(n − 1)yi.
This violates the requirement yiB ≤ −γ for i ∈ A.
10.3 Linking linear equilibria
Suppose that k ≤ n − 4 (and hence necessarily n ≥ 5). We focus on the equilibrium that is
generated by the partition
A = {1,...,k} and Z = {k + 1,...n}.
We indicate this equilibrium by (A,Z,Z), the coordinates in positions (k,k + 1,k + 2). We
wish to construct a path in the linear equilibrium correspondence that connects this linear
equilibrium to linear equilibrium (A,A,Z) generated by partition
A = {1,...,k + 1} and Z = {k + 2,...n}
via the linear equilibria (A,Z,B) and (A,A,B) generated by the partitions
A = {1,...,k} and B = {k + 2} and Z = {k + 1} ∪ {k + 3,...n}
and
A = {1,...,k + 1} and B = {k + 2} and Z = {k + 3,...n}
respectively.
Take K < 0 ﬁxed. Deﬁne R = 5n   K. Take λ ≥ 1. The parameter λ is our parametrization
for the line segment of perturbations above which we consider the equilibrium correspondence.
The constant R is chosen in such a way that the (1,B) coordinate of the resulting perturbation
is smaller (in the sense of “more negative”) than the (1,B) coordinate of y∗. We deﬁne the
perturbation




   
   
λ   R when i = 1,...,k
3nR when i = k + 1
2nR when i = k + 2
4nR when i = k + 3,...,n − 1
(4n)nR when i = n
and yiB =

   
   
λ   R when i = 1,...,k
R when i = k + 1
R when i = k + 2
4nR when i = k + 3,...,n − 1
(4n)nR when i = n
Notice that yiA = λ   R for i = 1,...,k. Thus, this value varies as λ changes. The other
values are ﬁxed throughout the construction. We show that the equilibrium correspondence
over the path of perturbations for λ ≥ 1, when restricted to the equilibria (A,Z,Z), (A,Z,B),
(A,A,B), and (A,A,Z), looks as follows.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .






















FIGURE: the graph of the equilibrium correspondence for k ≤ n − 4
Notice that indeed
1 <
n + k + 2
k
<
2n(n − k − 2) − 1
k
<
2n(n − k − 1)
k
.
The second inequality follows from the assumption that k ≤ n − 4 (and hence n − k − 2 ≥ 2).
Claim 1. The (A,Z,Z) equilibrium exists precisely when λ ≤
2n(n−k−1)
k . Given the parti-








n − k − 1
< 0.
15Formally yiA and yiB depend on both k and λ. For simplicity we suppress this dependence in the notation
though and simply keep the dependence in mind in the calculations.Minimal diversity games 36
Thus, the equilibrium conditions reduce to yiA ≤ γ for all i ∈ Z. So, since yk+2,A > yiA for all
i ∈ Z, i  = k + 2, the condition for this equilibrium to exist is
2nR ≤
kλR
n − k − 1
⇔ λ ≤
2n(n − k − 1)
k
.
Claim 2. The (A,A,Z) equilibrium exists precisely when λ ≤
2n(n−k−2)−1
k . Given the








n − k − 2
< 0.
Thus, the equilibrium conditions reduce to yiA ≤ γ for all i ∈ Z. So, since yk+2,A > yiA for all
i ∈ Z, i  = k + 2, the condition for this equilibrium to exist is
2nR ≤
kλR + R
n − k − 2
⇔ 2n ≥
kλ + 1
n − k − 2
⇔
2n(n − k − 2) − 1
k
≥ λ.
Claim 3. The (A,Z,B) equilibrium exists precisely when n+k+2
k ≤ λ ≤
2n(n−k−1)
k . Given















n − k − 2
[k   λ   R − 2nR]
while the equilibrium conditions reduce to yk+1,B ≤ −γ and yk+2,A ≤ γ. This yields
2nR ≤
kλR − 2nR
n − k − 2
≤ −R
which can be rewritten to
2n ≥
kλ − 2n
n − k − 2
≥ −1
and
2n + 2n(n − k − 2) ≥ kλ ≥ 2n − (n − k − 2)
and hence
n + k + 2
k
≤ λ ≤
2n(n − k − 1)
k
.
Claim 4. The (A,A,B) equilibrium exists precisely when n+k+2
k ≤ λ ≤
2n(n−k−2)−1
k . Given














kλR + R − 2nR
n − k − 3
while the equilibrium conditions reduce to yk+1,B ≤ −γ and yk+2,A ≤ γ. This yields
2nR ≤
kλR + R − 2nR
n − k − 3
≤ −RMinimal diversity games 37
which can be rewritten to
2n + 2n(n − k − 3) − 1 ≥ kλ ≥ 2n − (n − k − 3) − 1
and further to
n + k + 2
k
≤ λ ≤
2n(n − k − 2) − 1
k
.
Again the interval for λ is not degenerate because we assume that k ≤ n − 4.
Now suppose that k = n − 2, so that
A = {1,...,n − 2} and Z = {n − 1,...n}.
We connect the (A,Z,Z) equilibrium 16 generated by this partition to the (A,A,B) equilibrium
generated by the partition
A = {1,...,n − 1} and B = {n}.
In order to do this, again take R < 0 ﬁxed. For λ ≥ 1 we deﬁne the perturbation




λ   R when i = 1,...,n − 2
3nR when i = n − 1
2nR when i = n
and yiB =
 
λ   R when i = 1,...,n − 2
R when i = n − 1
R when i = n
We show that the equilibrium correspondence over the path of perturbations for λ ≥ 1, when
restricted to the equilibria (A,Z,Z), (A,Z,B), and (A,A,B), looks as follows. Notice that
indeed 1 < 2n
n−2.
16The letter coding here refers to the coordinates (n − 2,n − 1,n).
17For simplicity we again suppress the dependence of yiA and yiB on λ.Minimal diversity games 38




















λ −→ λ = 1
2n
n−2
FIGURE: the graph of the equilibrium correspondence for k = n − 2
Claim 1. The (A,Z,Z) equilibrium exists precisely when λ ≤ 2n







yjB = (n − 2)λR < 0.
Thus, the equilibrium conditions reduce to yiA ≤ γ for i = n − 1,n. So, since yn,A = 2nR >
3nR = yn−1,A, the condition for this equilibrium to exist is




Claim 2. The (A,A,B) equilibrium exists precisely when λ ≤ 2n
n−2. Given the partition, we









Claim 3. The (A,Z,B) equilibrium exists precisely when λ = 2n












yjB ⇔ 2nR = (n − 2)λR ⇔ λ =
2n
n − 2
.Minimal diversity games 39
For the perturbation where this equality holds we have the following line segment of linear
equilibria. For any γ with
for i = 1,...,n − 1 yiB ≤ −γ
for i = n − 1,n yiA ≤ γ
the vector x = (xiA,xiB)i∈N deﬁned by xiA = yiA for all i ∈ B, xiA = −yiB for all i ∈ A, and
xkA = γ, is a linear equilibrium. For this particular perturbation these conditions reduce to
yn−1,B = y ≤ −γ and ynA = 2nR ≤ γ.
On the side of the line segment of linear equilibria where the inequality yn−1,B ≤ −γ becomes
binding, the line segment connects to the line segment of (A,A,B) equilibria. On the side
where the inequality ynA ≤ γ becomes binding it connects to the line segment of (A,Z,Z)
linear equilibria.
10.4 Construction of f
Take an arbitrary K < 0. In this ﬁnal section we show that there exist an L < 0, a point
y∗ ∈ Y , and a continuous function f:X → Y that satisfy the four properties of Lemma 10.1.
Note that the constructions in the previous two sections only depend on K (and on R = 5nK).















when µ ≥ 1
2.
Deﬁne
Zk = {z(k,µ) | 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1}.
For k odd, k ≤ n − 2, deﬁne sets Ek, Nk and Sk as follows. Let Ek be the set of pairs
(z(k,µ),x) for which z(k,µ) ∈ Zk and x is a linear equilibrium of z(k,µ). Let Nk be the set
of pairs (z(k,µ),x) for which z(k,µ) ∈ Zk and x is a linear equilibrium of z(k,µ) of one of
the forms (A,Z,Z), (A,Z,B), (A,A,B), or (A,A,Z). Let Sk ⊂ X be the collection of points
x ∈ X for which there is a z(k,µ) ∈ Zk such that x is a linear equilibrium of the perturbation
z(k,µ) of one of the forms (A,Z,Z), (A,Z,B), (A,A,B), or (A,A,Z). Note that, for k = n−2,
type (A,A,Z) equilibria do not occur.Minimal diversity games 40
Before we proceed we ﬁrst need to state and prove four claims concerning the sets Sk, Nk and
Ek. The proofs are at times somewhat lengthy, and can be skipped in a ﬁrst reading of this
part of the paper.
Claim 1. Each Nk is compact. Hence, also each Sk is compact.
Proof of claim 1. The claim immediately follows from the observation that Sk is in fact the
projection of the closed and bounded set Nk.
Claim 2. Nk is isolated in Ek. So, there is an open neighborhood Uk of Nk such that for
every (z,x) ∈ Uk with (z,x) ∈ Ek we automatically have (z,x) ∈ Nk.
Proof of claim 2. Take sequences xt → x and µt → µ as t → ∞ such that (z(k,µt),xt) ∈ Ek
for all t and (z(k,µ),x) ∈ Nk. We show that (z(k,µt),xt) ∈ Nk for large t. We assume without
loss that all linear equilibria (z(k,µt),xt) have the same partition A, B, Z. Then we know that
A ⊂ A(µ), B ⊂ B(µ), and Z(µ) ⊂ Z. Moreover, i ∈ Z and i ∈ A(µ) can only happen when
γ(µ) = xiA > 0, and similarly i ∈ Z and i ∈ B(µ) can only happen when γ(µ) = xiA < 0.
A. Suppose x is of type (A,Z,Z) under z(k,µ). Then γ(µ) < 0. So, A = A(µ) = {1,...,k}.
Hence, since {k + 1,...,n} = Z(µ) ⊂ Z, xt is of type (A,Z,Z) under z(k,µt). The same
argument is valid when x is of type (A,A,Z) under z(k,µ).
Suppose x is of type (A,Z,B) under z(k,µ). Then µ > 1
2. So, we may assume that µt > 1
2
for all t. If γ(µ) ≤ 0, then xt is either of type (A,Z,B) or of type (A,Z,Z) for large t,
because A = A(µ) = {1,...,k} and {k + 1} ∪ {k + 3,...,n} = Z(µ) ⊂ Z. In either case
(z(k,µt),xt) in Nk for large t. If γ(µ) > 0. Then B = {k + 2}. Moreover, since k + 1 ∈ Z(µ),
xk+1,A = γ(µ) < −R. Now suppose that i ∈ Z for some i ∈ {1,...,k}. Then xt
iA = γ(µt) for
all t. However, since i ≤ k, we know that i ∈ A(µ), so that xiA = −λR ≥ −R. Thus, since
xt
iA → xiA and γ(µt) → γ(µ), γ(µ) ≥ −R. Contradiction. Hence, i ∈ A for all i ∈ {1,...,k},
and A = A(µ).
Suppose x is of type (A,A,B) under z(k,µ). Then µ > 1
2. So, we may assume that µt > 1
2 for
all t. If γ(µ) ≤ 0, then xt is either of type (A,A,B) or of type (A,A,Z) for large t. In either
case (z(k,µt),xt) in Nk for large t. If γ(µ) > 0. Then B = {k + 2}. Further, k + 1 ∈ A(µ),
so either k + 1 ∈ A or k + 1 ∈ Z. In either case, γ(µt) ≤ −R. Now take i ∈ {1,...,k}, and
assume that i ∈ Z. Then xt
iA = γ(µt) ≤ −R for all t. So, also xiA ≤ −R < −λR. This implies
that i / ∈ A(µ). Contradiction. Hence, {1,...,k} ⊂ A, and xt is either of type (A,A,B) or of
type (A,Z,B). In either case, (z(k,µt),xt) ∈ Nk. This completes the proof of Claim 2.Minimal diversity games 41
Claim 3. Nk only consists of the line segments indicated in the pictures in the previous
section. That is, for µ < 1
2, linear equilibria of type (A,Z,B) do not exist, and for µ < 1
2 and
k ≤ n − 4, also linear equilibria of type (A,A,B) do not exist.
Proof of claim 3. Suppose that (z(k,µ),x) ∈ Ek and µ < 1
2. We show that it is not of one
of the types (A,Z,B) or (A,A,B).
A. Suppose that (z(k,µ),x) is of type (A,Z,B). When k ≤ n − 4. Then |Z| ≥ 2. We show
that γ > −yk+1,B, which contradicts the assumption that k + 1 ∈ Z.
For µ = 0, writing yiA = yiB = yi, we know that












































[kR − 2nR] >
−n
n − 1
R > −R = −yk+1,B.
Thus, the inequality γ > −yk+1,B holds for both µ = 0 and µ = 1
2. Then by linearity it also
holds for all µ ∈ [0, 1
2].










However, for both µ = 0 and µ = 1




so that this strict inequality also holds for all µ ∈ [0, 1
2] by linearity.
B. Suppose that k ≤ n−4 and that (z(k,µ),x) is of type (A,A,B). We show that γ > −y1B,
which violates the assumption that 1 ∈ A. For µ = 0 we have
γ =
1
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(k + 1)   R − 2nR
n − k − 3
>
−nR
n − k − 3
> −R = y1B.
Hence, by linearity we ﬁnd that γ > −y1B for all µ ∈ [0, 1
2].
Claim 4. The sets S1,S3,...,Sn−2 are mutually disjoint.
Proof of claim 4. Take k ≤ n − 2, k odd, and l ≤ n − 2, l odd, with k  = l. Without loss,
k < l. Then l ≥ k + 2. Take an x ∈ Sk. Then, since l ≥ k + 2, xlA < 0. However, for every
y ∈ Sl we have ylA > 0. Hence, x / ∈ Sl, and Sk and Sl are disjoint.
These three claims already enable us to prove that G is not stable under the homotopy def-
inition. We however wish to prove a somewhat stronger statement, namely that G is not a
CKM-set. For this we need the following improvement on claim 2.
Claim 5. There is an open neighborhood Ok of Sk such that for every x ∈ Ok and every
z ∈ Zk with (z,x) ∈ Ek we automatically have (z,x) ∈ Nk.
Proof of claim 5. The proof is in several steps.
A. First take x ∈ Sk and z(k,µ) ∈ Zk with (z(k,µ),x) ∈ Ek. We show that (z(k,µ),x) ∈ Nk.
Since x ∈ Sk there exists a z(k,ν) ∈ Zk such that (z(k,ν),x) ∈ Nk. If both µ ≥ 1
2 and ν ≥ 1
2,
or if both µ ≤ 1
2 and ν ≤ 1
2, then by linearity of the linear equilibrium correspondence, the line
segment between (z(k,µ),x) and (z(k,ν),x) is a subset of Ek. Hence, since (z(k,ν),x) ∈ Nk,
also (z(k,µ),x) ∈ Nk in these two cases in view of claims 2 and 3.
Thus, we only need to consider the other two cases, namely (1) µ > 1
2 and ν < 1
2, and (2)
µ < 1
2 and ν > 1
2. Notice that x1A > 0, since x ∈ Sk. So, either 1 ∈ A(µ) or 1 ∈ Z(µ).
Suppose that 1 ∈ Z(µ). We derive a contradiction.
A1a. For k ≤ n − 4, k odd. Suppose the linear equilibrium x is of type (A,Z,Z) under
z(k,ν). So, A(ν) = {1,...,k} and Z(ν) = {k + 1,...,n}. Then x1A > 0 > xnA. So, since
1 ∈ Z(µ), we necessarily have n ∈ B(µ). Now notice that, for both z = y∗ and z = y∗(k,1) we
have the strict inequality




Therefore this strict inequality also holds for every z(k,µ). So, writing z = z(k,µ), and takingMinimal diversity games 43









































The conclusion −γ(µ) < z1B contradicts the equilibrium condition when 1 ∈ Z(µ). The
analogous suitably adjusted argument (using k + 1 instead of k) can be used for the (A,A,Z)
equilibrium.
A1b. For k ≤ n − 4 and k odd. Suppose the linear equilibrium x is of type (A,Z,B) or of
type (A,A,B) under z(k,ν). So, 1 ∈ A(ν) and k + 2 ∈ B(ν). Then x1A > 0 and xk+2,A < 0.
Thus, because we assumed that 1 ∈ Z(µ), necessarily k+2 ∈ B(µ). We derive a contradiction.
Note that, by A1, ν ≥ 1
2, so that z(k,ν) = y∗(k,λ) for
λ =
4n(n − k − 1)
k
  ν + 1 −
2n(n − k − 1)
k
.
Hence, xk+2,A = y∗(k,λ)k+2,A = 2nR. We only need to consider the case where µ < 1
2. Then
z(k,µ)k+2,A = (1 − 2µ)y∗
k+2,A + 2µy∗(k,1)k+2,A
= (1 − 2µ)(4n)
k+2K + 2µ2nR
≤ (1 − 2µ)(4n)3K + 2µ10n2K
< 10n2K = 2nR = xk+2,A,
which implies that k + 2 / ∈ B(µ). Contradiction.
A2. When k = n − 2. Then x is of one of three types (A,Z,Z), (A,Z,B), or (A,A,B)
under z(n − 2,ν).
A2a. When x is of type (A,Z,Z) under z(n − 2,ν), and ν > 1
2. Then xiA = −λR > 0 for
all i ≤ n−2, and xiA = λ(n−2)R < 0 for i = n−1,n. So, by the assumptions that µ < 1
2 and
1 ∈ Z(µ), we necessarily have Z(µ) = {1,...,n − 2} and B(µ) = {n − 1,n}. Then however,
xnA = z(n − 2,µ)nA. This, because µ < 1
2, yields
λ(n − 2)R = 2µ2nR + (1 − 2µ)(4n)nRMinimal diversity games 44
which, substituting t = 2µ, can be rewritten to









because t = 2µ < 1. This contradicts the assumption that x is a linear equilibrium of type
(A,Z,Z) under z(n − 2,ν).
A2b. When x is of type (A,Z,Z) under z(n − 2,ν) and ν < 1
2. Then xiA > xi−1,A > 0
for all 2 ≤ i ≤ n − 2, and xn−1,A = xnA < 0 for i = n − 1,n. So, when 1 ∈ Z(µ), then
necessarily A(µ) = {2,...,n − 2} B(µ) = {n − 1,n}, and Z(µ) = {1}. Thus, x is a type II
linear equilibrium under z(n − 2,µ), and the equality
 
j∈B(µ)




should hold. Now notice that for both z = y∗ and z = y∗(n − 2,λ) with λ ≤ 2n
n−2 + 1 we have









holds for every 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1. Contradiction.
A2c. When x is of type (A,Z,B) under z(n − 2,ν). Then automatically ν > 1
2. So, we
may assume that µ < 1
2. Since ν > 1
2, we know that xiA = −λR > 0 for all i ≤ n − 2, and
xnA = 2nR < 0. So, since µ < 1
2 and 1 ∈ Z(µ), necessarily {2,...,n − 2} ⊂ Z(µ). Further,
since n − 1 ∈ Z(ν), we have
xn−1,A < −z(n − 1,ν)n−1,B ≤ −z(n − 1,ν)1B = x1A.
Thus, xn−1,A < x1A, and then necessarily n − 1 ∈ B(µ). If xn−1,A < 0. So, {1,...,n − 2} =
Z(µ) and {n − 1,n} = B(µ). This however means that
−λR = x1A = γ(µ) = −
z(n − 2,µ)n−1,A + z(n − 2,µ)nA
n − 3
.
However, since µ < 1
2, we can deduce that z(n−2,µ)n−1,A < 3nR and z(n−2,µ)n−1,A < 2nR.
Then, since λ ≤ 2n
n−2, the above equality implies that
2n(n − 3)
n − 2
≥ 5nMinimal diversity games 45
which contradicts the assumption that n ≥ 3.
A2d. When x is of type (A,A,B) under z(k,ν), ν < 1
2 and µ > 1
2. Then, since ν < 1
2, we
have
xn−1,B < xn−2,B <     < x1B < 0.
Then the assumption 1 ∈ Z(µ) implies that Z(µ) = {1}, A(µ) = {2,...,n−1} and B(µ) = {n}.
However, since z(n−2,µ)iB = λ R for all i = 2,...,n−2, A(µ) = {2,...,n−1} implies that
n ≥ 5 is not possible. Therefore necessarily n = 3. In this case, Z(µ) = {1}, A(µ) = {2} and
B(µ) = {3}. So, x is a type II linear equilibrium under z(n−2,µ). Type II equilibria however
only occur when we have the equality
 
j∈B(µ)




which for n = 3 reduces to the requirement z(n − 2,µ)3A = z(n − 2,µ)2B. However, since
µ > 1
2, we have z(n − 2,µ)3A = 2nR = 6R and z(n − 2,µ)2B = R. Contradiction.
A2e. When x is of type (A,A,B) under z(k,ν), ν > 1
2 and µ < 1
2. Since ν > 1
2, and x is of
type (A,A,B) under z(n − 2,ν), it follows that x1B = λ   R and xn−1,B = R. Hence
x1B < xn−1,B < 0
which immediately contradicts the assumption 1 ∈ Z(µ).
So, the assumption 1 ∈ Z(µ) led to a contradiction in all cases. Hence, 1 ∈ A(µ). This implies
that x1A = −z(k,µ)1B. We continue the proof that z(k,µ),x) ∈ Nk.
A3. First we show that the function µ  → z(k,µ)1B is strictly decreasing, so that the value
of x1A uniquely determines the value of µ. For µ ≥ 1
2, z(k,µ)1B = y∗(k,λ)1B = λ   K, where
λ =
4n(n − k − 1)
k
  µ + 1 −
2n(n − k − 1)
k
.
Obviously λ is strictly increasing in µ. Hence, because K < 0, λ K is strictly decreasing in µ.
For µ ≤ 1
2,
z(k,µ)1B = (1 − 2µ)y∗
1B + 2µy∗(k,1)1B = (1 − 2µ)   4nK + 2µ   R.
Since R = 5n   K < 4nK, this expression is indeed strictly decreasing in µ.
Now we can ﬁnish the proof of A. Since, µ  → z(k,µ)1B is strictly decreasing, and both 1 ∈ A(ν)
and 1 ∈ A(µ), we ﬁnd that µ = ν. Then however also z(k,µ) = z(k,ν). Hence, z(k,µ),x) =
z(k,ν) ∈ Nk. This completes the proof of part A.Minimal diversity games 46
B. Now take x ∈ Sk and z ∈ Zk with (z,x) / ∈ Nk. Then in view of A also (z,x) / ∈ Ek. So,
there exists a neighborhood U(z,x) of (z,x) such that U(z,x) ∩ Ek is empty. Now let Vk be the
union of sets Uk and U(z,x), where Uk is chosen as in claim 2. Then Vk is a neighborhood of
the compact set Sk × Zk such that Vk ∩ Ek = Nk. By compactness of Sk × Zk there are open
neighborhoods Ok of Sk and Wk of Zk such that Ok × Wk is a subset of Vk. This concludes
the proof of claim 4.
We continue with the construction of y∗, L, and f as speciﬁed in Lemma 10.1. Let y∗ be
the initial perturbation deﬁned in Section 10.2. Further, due to Claims 1 and 4 we can ﬁnd
bounded and open sets Vk in X such that Sk ⊂ Vk ⊂ Ok for each k, and such that the respective
closures V1,V3,...,V2n−3 are mutually disjoint 18. Since each Vk is bounded, we can choose
an L < 0 such that for each Vk and each x ∈ Vk we have xiA > L and xiB > L.
Next, by the Lemma of Urysohn, for each k there exists a continuous function
gk:X → [0,1]
such that gk = 1 on Sk and gk = 0 outside Vk. Deﬁne the function f:X → Y by
f(x) =
 
z(k,gk(x)) if x ∈ Vk for some k = 1,...,n − 2, k odd
y∗ else
We show that y∗, L, and f satisfy the conditions of Lemma 10.1.
A. We show that f is continuous.
Proof of A. Take a sequence (xt)∞
t=1 converging to x. We show that f(xt) → f(x) as t → ∞.
The only slightly non-trivial case is where xt ∈ Vk for some k, and x / ∈ Vk. In that case
f(x) = y∗, while by the continuity of gk we have gk(xt) → 0 as t → ∞. Hence,
f(xt) = z(k,gk(xt)) → z(k,0) = y∗ = f(x)
as t → ∞.
B. We show that f(x)iA ≤ K and f(x)iB ≤ K for all x ∈ X and all coordinates (i,A) and
(i,B).
Proof of B. Trivial once we observe that this holds for y∗ as well as for all y∗(k,λ).
C. Suppose that (x,y∗) is a linear equilibrium. We show that xiA > L and xiB > L for all
i ∈ N.
18Recall that we also need to take care of the equilibria of type (B,Z,Z), (B,B,Z), and (B,B,A). The
corresponding n−1
2 sets are indexed by indices n,n + 2,...,2n − 3.Minimal diversity games 47
Proof of C. Also easy once we observe that, according to Section 10.2, the only linear
equilibrium of the form (x,y∗) for which x is not an element of some Sk is when xiA = xiB = 0
for all i, in which case the inequalities also hold.
D. For every x ∈ X with xiA ≤ L or xiB ≤ L for at least one i ∈ N we have f(x) = y∗.
Proof of D. Immediate from the deﬁnition of f, once we observe that the condition xiA ≤ L
or xiB ≤ L for at least one i ∈ N implies that x is not an element of any Vk.
E. Suppose x ∈ X with xiA > L and xiB > L for all i ∈ N. Suppose that (x,f(x)) is a
linear equilibrium. Then x = 0.
Proof of E. Suppose that x ∈ Vk for some k. Then, since (x,f(x)) ∈ Ek by construction,
we know from Claim 4 that (x,f(x)) ∈ Nk. This implies that x ∈ Sk. So, gk(x) = 1 by
construction. Hence,
f(x) = z(k,1) = y∗
 
k,





However, from Section 10.3 we know that for λ >
2n(n−k−1)
k the perturbation y∗(k,λ) does
not have any linear equilibria in Sk. Thus, x / ∈ Vk for all k. Then f(x) = y∗. According to
Section 10.2, x = 0 is the only linear equilibrium of y∗ outside the sets Sk ⊂ Vk.
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